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There is so much to say about Justice Antonin Scalia. He 
has already been the subject of a full biography by Joan 
Biskupic (American Original
1
) and a two-person play (The 
Originalist
2
), both of which captured the essence of what made 
him such a polarizing Justice. Others in this symposium will 
write about his contributions to various substantive areas of 
the law and to constitutional interpretation generally. I have 
chosen to write about some very important parts of his nearly 
thirty years on the Supreme Court bench that might not catch 
the attention of others. 
I. PREDICTIONS ARE HARD TO MAKE 
Most Americans, indeed most lawyers, are very surprised 
to learn that Justice Scalia was unanimously confirmed 98-0 by 
the Senate in 1986. Part of the explanation for the vote was 
that there had been a major battle over the elevation of William 
Rehnquist from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, and the 
opposition had largely run out of gas when it came time to 
consider the Scalia nomination. But the main reason for the 
lack of opposition was that then-Circuit Judge Scalia had no 
record that would suggest how he would vote in controversial 
cases before the Supreme Court. 
What is significant about that fact is that the reason he 
had no such record will apply to future nominees whose main 
record is how they decided cases that came before them. Lower 
court judges, even those sitting on circuit courts of appeals, are 
bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, whether they agree 
or not. But once on the High Court, that legal impediment is 
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gone, and a Justice is free to decide a case the way he or she 
thinks is correct. That does not mean that precedents are 
thrown out the window, but they are less important and can be 
more easily distinguished, if not overruled, when sitting on the 
Supreme Court than in a lower court. In addition, Justices 
change their views once on the High Court, even if they are in 
their mid-50s when appointed. Justices Harry Blackmun and 
John Paul Stevens are two examples of Justices whose views 
“evolved” over their tenures to become more skeptical of 
government. And Chief Justice Rehnquist evolved in a different 
way when he became Chief: as an Associate Justice he 
frequently concurred and dissented, but he did that much less 
often after he was elevated to Chief Justice. 
There is another reason why Judge Scalia’s record was a 
poor indicator of what his Supreme Court record would be: the 
very different mix of cases in the two fora, especially because 
he sat on the D.C. Circuit. There are a number of respects in 
which the case mix in the D.C. Circuit differs from that of other 
federal circuits. First, a very high percentage of cases are either 
direct appeals from administrative agencies or come from 
judgments involving those agencies that originate in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. Other appeals 
courts have some (and in the case of immigration cases, many 
more) of those kinds of cases, but most of the most significant of 
these cases come to the D.C. Circuit. These cases raise 
important issues, some of constitutional magnitude, but they 
rarely raise the kind of hot-button issue that would cause 
trouble in a confirmation hearing or be the subject of a public 
controversy. In fact, Judge Scalia did have a record in 
administrative law on the issue of standing, and while he was 
less willing to allow cases to proceed than others, his views at 
that time could not have been characterized as extreme. 
Second, the criminal docket of direct appeals is small, but 
the distinguishing feature in this subject area is that there are 
no prisons in the District of Columbia from which state and 
federal habeas corpus cases emanate. By contrast, other federal 
circuits and the Supreme Court have very significant habeas 
dockets, so a nominee from another circuit might have more of 
a record on issues such as the reach of the Fourth Amendment, 
the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay 
allowed under state law, and the extent to which the right to 
trial by jury applies to criminal sentences—and the 
retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure—, all of which 
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Third, the issues with which he is most strongly identified 
today—abortion, affirmative action, free speech (often in an 
election context), the religion clauses, and gun rights—were not 
litigated in the D.C. Circuit either while he was there or 
afterwards, with the exception of gun cases and a few election 
law cases. Part of this is explainable because those cases are 
generally based on state or local laws: the D.C. Circuit’s one 
jurisdiction generally stays away from controversies in these 
areas, or is overruled by Congress if the city oversteps what its 
overseers see as its proper boundaries. 
To be sure, Judge Scalia served on the D.C. Circuit for only 
four years, whereas the current nominee, Chief Judge Merrick 
Garland, has been on that Court for almost twenty years. But 
those seeking reasons to reject the Garland nomination have 
found that he has not sat on many controversial cases, and 
when he has, he has taken largely mainstream positions. Judge 
Garland is a moderate person, by temperament and judicial 
philosophy, but to many who thought they knew Judge Scalia 
reasonably well when he was appointed, he turned out to be a 
much different Justice than they had expected. The bottom line 
on this point is Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court shows that 
Yogi Berra was correct when he observed, “predictions are very 
difficult, especially when they are about the future.” 
II. CHALLENGES AT ORAL ARGUMENT 
Any lawyer who will argue a case before the Supreme 
Court either knows or is told well beforehand not to plan on 
speaking very long and be prepared to answer a barrage of 
questions. Except for Justice Thomas, the other Justices are all 
very active. Even with the death of Justice Scalia, who was 
probably at the top of the list of questioners for most 
arguments, the Court is not likely to revert to the days when 
counsel could make lengthy openings and get questions from 
only a few of the Justices. 
 
 4. His views on the death penalty had not been the subject of his 
decisions in the D.C. Circuit, but that would not have been different had he 
been on other circuit courts in the early 1980s because the surge in post-
Furman cases had not yet percolated to the federal courts of appeals. See 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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In many cases, you knew where Justice Scalia was likely to 
come out, and you had to be prepared for very tough questions, 
with no opportunity to give an answer designed to hide a 
weakness and hope to move on. If you did not answer his 
question, Justice Scalia did not let go, or at least not until he 
became convinced that you had no answer, or none that would 
satisfy him. He often spoke early in the argument, but if he did 
not pose a question for the petitioner, respondent’s counsel had 
better be ready. The Justice would often rock back in his chair 
and then pounce on counsel with a question that was rarely 
neutral, but at least you knew what he thought about the issue. 
In his informal talks, Justice Scalia often spoke about oral 
arguments, and the one thought that has always stayed with 
me is his question, “what are the five worst words counsel can 
utter in response to a hypothetical question?” Answer: “that is 
not this case,” to which the Justice would always say something 
along the lines of, “of course we know what this case is about; 
we are not morons.” He would then tell his audience that the 
judge is asking about the next case to help the judge decide 
which way to go on this one. He would then add that once you 
have answered the question the judge has asked, not the one 
you wish had been asked, you can then explain why that case is 
different from this, or why your position in this case does not 
lead inexorably to the undesirable outcome in the next one. His 
point, which is not limited to next-case questions, is that 
questions should be seen as opportunities and not obstacles, 
because you have the judge’s attention and perhaps can dispel 
a misguided notion that might otherwise doom your case. 
Over the years, I have done a number of moot courts for 
lawyers arguing in the Supreme Court for the first time, and 
the subject of what to do about Justice Scalia’s likely hostile 
questions often was raised. My answer was that you had to do 
your best to respond, but recognize that your answer may not 
persuade him, and then remember that Justice Scalia had only 
one vote. That was meant not only as a factual assertion, but as 
a reminder not to answer a question in a way that you hoped 
would get the Scalia vote, if it meant sacrificing other votes you 
needed to get to five. It also meant that you sometimes needed 
to try to shift gears and hope to engage other Justices who were 
more likely to agree with you than Justice Scalia. 
III. THE USE AND MISUSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Before Judge Scalia became Justice Scalia, Supreme Court 
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advocates as well as the Justices would use legislative history 
extensively to support their preferred reading of federal 
statutes. This included not only committee reports and 
statements by the main sponsors, but also discussions at 
committee hearings on a bill and floor statements by random 
members, including some from an era when the Congressional 
Record did not distinguish between those statements actually 
delivered on the floor, and those simply inserted into the 
Record. Justice Scalia would have none of that. His view was 
that the only thing that mattered was the text of the law 
actually voted on by both Houses of Congress and signed into 
law by the President, and so for him, all legislative history was 
out of bounds. 
The Justice advanced his positions in opinions in which he 
explained why he considered the use of legislative history to be 
illegitimate, but he found a unique way to express his 
continued opposition to its use once his main argument had 
become clear to all. In cases in which he agreed with the 
outcome and the basic reasoning of the majority, but in which 
the author of the opinion included a section using legislative 
history to support the outcome, Justice Scalia would file an 
opinion concurring, except as to the legislative history section 
or sometimes excepting to a footnote in which some mention of 
the forbidden subject was made. Finally, as time passed and 
other Justices continued to use legislative history, that section 
of their opinion would begin with a phrase such as “for those 
who find legislative history useful . . . ,” from which Justice 
Scalia apparently concluded that he had largely won the battle 
and no longer felt the need to concur, except as to that section. 
Justice Scalia did not win the legislative history war, but 
he did succeed in narrowing the battlefield considerably. While 
I have not attempted (and do not intend to attempt) to do a 
scientific survey of the average number of legislative history 
citations per case or per 100 words of Supreme Court opinions 
in the past decade as compared to the years before Justice 
Scalia joined the Court, I am confident, as a regular reader of 
Court opinions, that the number is way down. But perhaps 
more important than the numbers are the portions of 
legislative history cited. Now the citations are to the conference 
committee reports (which are often the only thing members 
read because they are written in non-legalese) or perhaps to the 
portions of the House or Senate committee reports that explain, 
in broad terms, what the law is designed to accomplish. These 
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reports, which may be written by staff, but are reviewed by the 
committee chairs, ranking members, and others most 
interested in the bills, often explain the purpose behind the law 
and help illuminate the meaning of provisions that otherwise 
seem quite opaque. In other situations, when the issue relates 
to a particular subsection, and everything in the legislative 
history points in one direction, most Justices are still willing to 
take that information into account in trying to understand 
what the enacted text means. And Justice Scalia’s main point—
that at best statements by individual members reflect only 
their views, no matter what position they held in relation to a 
particular bill—has been largely (if silently) accepted, most of 
the time, by most of the Justices. That may not be total victory, 
but it is a major accomplishment, neither liberal nor 
conservative, for which Justice Scalia deserves most of the 
credit. 
There is one category of legislative history that the Justice 
opposed on which he is off the mark. The process by which the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as well as those for Appellate 
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Bankruptcy) are 
amended is a very thorough and complicated one. For each of 
these areas there is a committee which is comprised of judges, 
practicing lawyers, and academics, as well as one or more law 
professor reporters with expertise in that area. Before an 
amendment is approved by the Supreme Court, it goes through 
an extensive notice and comment process, often with public 
hearings and with committee meetings open to all interested 
persons. Accompanying each amendment are what are called 
Advisory Notes, which are initially drafted by the reporters, but 
thoroughly reviewed and edited in detail by the committee 
members, although not by the Justices whose approval is 
needed before they become effective. Despite this pedigree, 
Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Krupski v. Costa 
Crociere S.p.A. that these notes were simply another form of 
legislative history, not worthy of consideration except to the 
extent that it is like other scholarly commentary
5
—a belief for 
which he was rightly taken to task by Duke Law Professor Paul 
Carrington, who was the Civil Rules Committee Reporter at the 




 5. 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 6. Paul Carrington, Commentary: Showing Disdain for Official 
Legislative History, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www 
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Justice Scalia’s distaste for legislative history did not 
extend to constitutional history, as best exemplified in his 
detailed reliance on it in District of Columbia v. Heller,
7
 in 
sustaining a broad reading of the right to bear arms under the 
Second Amendment. His consideration there included English 
history, the colonial experience, what the states were doing at 
the time the amendment was enacted, and even what happened 
in the states after it became law. To be sure, the analogies to 
legislative history in statutes are not precise, but they are close 
enough to require some explanation for their differing 
treatment; however, the Justice (to my knowledge) never 
attempted to defend those differences. Moreover, to the extent 
that Justice Scalia found the Federalist Papers to be helpful in 
other cases, they suffer from three deficiencies that should have 
made them at least as suspect as conventional legislative 
history: they were (anonymous) advocacy pieces, written by 
only one person (per paper), and they appeared after the 
language in the Constitution had already been agreed upon.
8
 
IV. THE LONE DISSENTER 
Early in his time on the High Court, Justice Scalia 
demonstrated his willingness to stand by his views, even in the 
face of unanimous opposition in cases of major constitutional 
and practical significance. I refer to his dissents in the 
separation of powers challenges to the independent counsel 
statute
9
 and the federal sentencing guidelines.
10
 As the junior 
Justice in both cases, and with the outcome not in doubt, many 
judges would have simply gone along or written brief dissents, 
but that was not Justice Scalia. In both cases, he wrote 
impassioned dissents explaining at great length why the 




 7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 8. The notes from the Convention are further suspect because, unlike 
proceedings in Congress, which are taken verbatim by a court reporter, the 
notes are those of participants in the deliberations. I shudder to think that 
anyone would ever rely on my notes of a meeting or even a lecture, assuming 
that my handwriting and abbreviations could be deciphered. 
 9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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Today, the independent counsel act is no longer on the 
books, although attorneys general continue to appoint them 
from time to time. Congress’s decision not to renew the law was 
prompted by the many practical problems that resulted from its 
operation in several situations, most notably and probably of 
greatest influence, the Whitewater investigation and the 
eventual, but unsuccessful, impeachment of President Clinton. 
The sentencing guidelines, which were actually much less 
flexible than their name implied, eventually became advisory, 
the result of a series of decisions interpreting the constitutional 
right to trial by jury as precluding judges from making factual 
findings that increased the sentence of a defendant. In neither 
case would it be accurate to say that Justice Scalia’s opinions 
became the law by changing the views of his colleagues on the 
original issues, but the concerns that he expressed in both 
dissents became part of the reason why those schemes no 
longer exist in their prior form. 
To be sure, Justice Scalia was not always a lone dissenter, 
some of his dissents became the views of the majority, and he is 
surely not the only Justice who was ever, or even often, a lone 
dissenter. But these two dissents are special because they were 
early in his time on the Court, the cases were of great 
significance, and he expressed his views at length and in very 
passionate terms. Thus, they can be seen as a harbinger of 
opinions to come and of his willingness to stand his intellectual 
ground even when no one else agreed with him. 
V. THE DOOMSDAY FORECASTER 
Justice Scalia was well-known for his attacks, sometimes 
bordering on the personal, on the opinions of other Justices, 
especially in his concurrences and dissents. What has been less 
noted were his doomsday predictions of what would happen in 
the wake of a majority opinion with which he disagreed. One 
famous example is his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas,
11
 in which 
he predicted that striking down the ban on sodomy would lead 
to the invalidation of laws that limited marriage to opposite sex 
couples.
12
 He reinforced that prediction in his dissent in United 
States v. Windsor,
13
 striking down the Federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), and these predictions came true in 
 
 11. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 604–05 
 13. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709–11 (2013) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
  




 It is doubtful that opponents of the ban 
on same-sex marriage were buoyed by the Scalia dissents to 
challenge those laws, but there is no doubt that his dissent in 
the DOMA case was cited by many lower court judges to justify 
taking the next step that led to Obergefell.
15
 
As the term wound down last June, it seemed to me that 
Justice Scalia’s doomsday predictions were on the increase and 
that the tones of his disagreements were raised a notch, if not a 
decibel, or two. I collected a half-dozen of my favorites from 
that term in an essay titled “Summersaults of Statutory 
Interpretation,”
16
 a Scalia quote from King v. Burwell.
17
 In his 
dissent in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
18
 he likened the power given to 
the President to that possessed by the King of England and 
prophesized that the decision “will systematically favor the 
unitary President over the plural Congress in disputes 
involving foreign affairs,” which will result in a foreign policy 
“perhaps as effective as that of a monarchy.”
19
 But, he 
continued, “[i]t is certain that, in the long run, it will erode the 
structure of separated powers that the People established for 
the protection of their liberty.”
20
 
In Obergefell he decried that the majority “says that my 
Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is 
a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.”
21
 He 
viewed the decision as “tak[ing] from the People a question 
properly left to them” and “unabashedly based not on law, but 
on the ‘reasoned judgment’ of a bare majority of this Court,” 
 
 14. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 15. See, e.g., Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C. 2014) 
(“Although the Windsor holding dealt only with the validity of certain 
provisions of federal statutory law, Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, correctly 
predicted that an assault on state same sex marriage bans would follow 
Windsor.”) 
 16. Alan B. Morrison, Somersaults of Statutory Interpretation,  
SLATE (July 22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2015/07/antonin_scalia_s_angry_opinions_the_supreme_court_ 
s_decisions_are_dangerous.html. My original title, which was changed without 
notice at the last minute, was “Crying Wolf.” 
 17. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The somersaults 
of statutory interpretation they have performed . . . will be cited by litigants 
endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence.”) 
 18. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 19. Id. at 2123. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015). 
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from which he concluded that “we move one step closer to being 
reminded of our [the People’s] impotence.”
22
 
His dissent in King v. Burwell,
23
 the most recent Affordable 
Care Act decision, concluded that, based on the majority’s 
opinion, “[w]ords no longer have meaning” and that it “is hard 
to come up with a clearer way” to say the opposite of how the 
majority read the law.
24
 After proceeding through what he saw 
were fatal defects in the majority’s opinion, prefaced by phrases 
such as “making matters worse,”
25
 “for its next defense of the 
indefensible,”
26
 and “even less defensible, if possible,”
27
 the 
Justice zeroed in on what he saw as the heart of the problem: 
“[t]oday’s opinion changes the usual rules of statutory 
interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act” because 
of “the Court’s decision to take matters into its own hands” 




Perhaps the most overstated of Scalia’s dissents was 
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama.
29
 His opinion 
began: “[t]oday, the Court issues a sweeping holding that will 
have profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one 
person, one vote, for the future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
and for the primacy of the State in managing its own 
elections.”
30
 He predicted that the “consequences of this 
unprincipled decision will reverberate far beyond the narrow 
circumstances presented in this case,” suggesting that the 
majority had made a major change in the law.
31
 However, his 
disagreement was only over whether it was proper to allow the 
plaintiffs to make certain allegations before the Supreme Court 
that they had omitted below and thus keep the case alive. How 
that irreparably damaged the principle of one person, one vote 
is far from clear. 
Whenever one dissents, whether in a judicial decision or a 
faculty committee, a choice must be made between attempting 
 
 22. Id. at 2631. 
 23. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 2497. 
 25. Id. at 2498. 
 26. Id. at 2502. 
 27. Id. at 2506. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1281. 
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to narrow the majority’s decision or pointing out its potentially 
apocalyptic consequences. Justice Scalia has chosen the second 
option as his preferred choice in most cases. It no doubt made 
him feel better that he had fully expressed his misgivings in 
clear terms, but whether it helped his long range goals of 
reigning in a Court that he concluded was no longer 
interpreting the law, but making it up, remains to be seen. 
 
